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A General Equilibrium Theory of Contracts in Community Supported Agriculture
Thomas W. Sproul and Jaclyn D. Kropp*
Abstract
Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) contracts allow consumers to buy claims on a farm’s
future production. In turn, the consumer provides working capital to the farm during the growing
season. CSA contracts also provide risk management for farmers with limited access to Federal
crop insurance by transferring part of the farm’s risk to the consumer. We derive a theory of
CSA contract pricing for the two most prevalent types of CSA contracts: yield contracts, in
which consumers receive a percentage of the farm’s production, and weight contracts, in which
consumers receive fixed quantities. We develop a two-period model in which expected utility
maximizing producers and consumers engage in CSA contracting in the first period based on
anticipation of yields and spot prices in the second period. Using the model, we generate several
testable hypotheses to be explored in future research. Additionally, we present an overview of
the data necessary to test the propositions and potential issues data requirements and potential
challenges that might arise in related empirical work.
Keywords: agricultural marketing, direct marketing, community supported agriculture, CSA,
contract prices, local food, risk premium, risk-sharing
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Community Supported Agricultural (CSA) programs are a form of direct marketing used by
farmers, in which the farmer contracts with consumers prior to harvest to deliver products later in
the season. CSA contracting, along with farmers markets, have become a key part of local food
and farm-to-table movements. In addition to the benefits received by consumers associated with
supporting local farmers, the local farmers also benefit from these contractual arrangements.
Since farmers receive the proceeds of CSA contracts before harvest, CSA contracting provides
working capital to farmers during the growing season. In addition, consumers purchasing CSA
contracts share in the farm’s risks, and thus CSA are an important source of risk management for
farmers who may have limited access to Federal crop insurance because the products they
produce are not covered, or coverage is limited.
While the concept of CSA programs originated in Japan and Europe in the 1960s, by the
1980s New England farmers began offering CSA programs (Wilkinson 2001). Since the 1980s,
CSA programs have spread across the United States; by 2012, over 12,600 farms offered CSA
programs (U.S. Departments of Agriculture 2014a). As CSA programs grew in popularity in
New England and the rest of the United States, a variety of contract types emerged to meet the
needs of both producers and consumers. The key differences between the various contract types
hinges on the degree to which consumers share in the farm’s risk.
Although CSA are an increasingly important direct marketing tool used by farms, to our
knowledge, a formal pricing model of the different types of contract does not exist in the current
literature. Furthermore, to our knowledge, no other studies address the emergence of the various
types of CSA contracting. Thus, we develop a two period model of CSA contractual
arrangements between consumers and farmers. In the first period, expected utility maximizing
farmers and consumer engage in CSA contracting based on expectations of yields and prices in
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the spot market in the second time period; then, in the second period, yields are realized and
contracts delivers occur. Essentially, the two-period model consists of a general equilibrium in
each period with the equilibrium at time 0 informed by expectations of the various states of
nature (yield outcomes) at time T . Using no-arbitrage principles of futures and options pricing,
we derive a theory of CSA contract pricing and develop price relationships between the two most
common types of CSA contracts. Since we are primarily interested in the contractual
arrangements, we make several simplifying assumptions including that CSA contracting occurs
after planting. We then use the derived model to generate some testable propositions to be
explored in future research. Namely, (i) yield contracts should have lower market prices than
weight contracts, all else equal, (ii) whether farmers specialize in one contract type, or sell a mix
of both, will depend on the covariance of prices and revenues which affects the value of each
contract type as a hedge against income risk, and (iii) crop diversification will reduce CSA
contract offerings by farmers specialized in one contract type, but may not reduce offerings by
farmers selling a mix of contract types. We conclude by discussing the data needed to test these
propositions as well as potential issues one might encounter when undertaking empirical work.
CSA Contractual Terms and Types of CSA Contracts
Most farms’ CSA contracts provide the consumer, often referred to as a “member” or
“shareholder”, with a basket of products to be received at regular intervals throughout the
contract period. While some farms might include all products produced on the farm in its CSA
contract, other farms specify only a few crops or a single crop to be included. Thus, the products
offered vary widely across contracts. CSA contracts are typically written for a season, which is
usually 8-14 or 20-26 weeks. During the season, the CSA members typically receive their
portion of the contracting farm’s harvest on a weekly or bi-weekly basis. While the majority of
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farms offering CSA contracts require members to pick up their portion of the harvest at the farm
or a farmers market, some CSA farms deliver the products directly to their members’ homes or
places of business. Although CSA contracts provide the promised products to the consumers
over the course of several weeks or months, for tractability we assume that CSA contracting
occurs at time 0 and that all products are delivered simultaneously at time T . This allows us to
focus on the types of CSA contracts offered by farms and the pricing relationships between the
contract types.
The majority of CSA contracts’ terms are structures such that members receive a
specified percentage of the various products produced by the farm throughout the season.
Because the members engaging in this type of arrangement receive a specific proportion of the
farm’s output (total yield), the exact amount (weight) of each product to be received is not
specified in advance in the contract, as the amount depends on the farm’s actual production of
the product(s) under contract. In effect, the value of what the member receives at time T is equal
to a percentage of the farm revenue. In other words, the member shares in the contracting farm’s
revenue risk or combined production (yield) and price risks. We refer to these contracts as “yield
contracts.”
Other CSA contracts are structured such that they provide consumers with a
predetermined, fixed quantity or weight of each covered product at harvest. We refer to these
contracts as “weight contracts.” These types of CSA contracts are similar to forward contracts in
that the farm has committed to selling a pre-specified quantity at a fixed price. In this case, the
price risk is removed for both consumer and producer, but the farm bears the full burden of the
yield risk without the benefit of price risk as a natural hedge. Price risk acts as a natural hedge

	
  

3

for yield risk in the production of agricultural products because prices and yields are usually
negatively correlated, due to spatial correlations of weather and supply-and-demand effects.
Still other CSA contracts are structured such that they operate as a debit system; members
pre-pay by purchasing a CSA contract at the beginning of the season and receive a fixed dollar
amount to spend at the farm over the season. Typically, these members receive an explicit
discount (usually 10%) off the prevailing prices of these commodities when they make their
purchases using their debit balance. We refer to these contracts as “debit contracts.” In this case,
the members may not share directly in the farm’s risks, but still provide working capital to the
farm. Lastly, some CSA farms offer “you-pick”, where members are given some choice in the
products they receive. With “you-pick” contracts, at each pickup, members make selections
among similarly-valued options. Thus, “you-pick” contracts resemble debit shares because
choices are arranged according to market value.
Benefits to Consumers and Producers from CSA Contracting
While there is a dearth of studies investigating the risk-sharing nature of contractual
arrangements of CSA programs, several studies investigate the factors that determine consumer
participation in CSA programs, consumer benefits associated with CSA program participation,
the effects of CSA program participation on local communities, and the effects of CSA
contracting on farms (see Brown 2002 and Brown and Miller 2008 for a review of this
literature). We present an overview of previous studies pertaining to CSA programs. However, in
general, these studies are descriptive in nature, anecdotal, or take a case study approach with
information drawn from a small sample of farms. The lack of more comprehensive studies is
likely driven by challenges encountered in obtaining data pertaining to CSA contracting and
participation. We will discuss some of these challenges in later sections.
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Kolodinskya and Pelchb (1997) use a sample of 286 survey respondents to draw
conclusions about the determinants of CSA program participation by consumers. Using data
collected through phone interviews of non-members, members and former members of three
Vermont CSA farms and a binomial logit model, they found that households with children under
12 or with teenagers were less likely to join a CSA program, while more educated households
and households who regularly buy organic products were more likely to join. They also found a
negative relationship between price of the CSA contract and the likelihood of membership.
However, there was no significant relationship between household income and the probability of
joining a CSA program.
Consumer benefits associated with CSA membership include access to locally grown,
fresh products throughout the growing season, improved nutrition and cost savings as well as
social benefits. A study of four CSA programs in Pennsylvania found that members increased
both the quantity and variety of produce that they consumed as a result of joining their CSA
(Oberholtzer 2004). Similarly, Ostrom (2007) found CSA members in Minnesota and Wisconsin
reported increased consumption of vegetables, consumption of a greater variety of vegetables,
and changing to healthier eating habits as a result of CSA membership. Several studies suggest
that CSA members spend less on CSA memberships than they would spend if they purchased the
same bundle of goods at the grocery store (Cooley and Lass 1998; Farnsworth et al. 1996; Sabih
and Baker 2000). Furthermore, Farnsworth et al. (1996) concluded CSA members’ decisions to
join CSA programs were dominated by the social or “club” benefits they provide. These benefits
included sharing and supporting common interests, value added from having someone else select
their vegetables, altering their eating habits, and giving their excess produce to neighbors and
friends. Consumers might join a CSA due to preferences for supporting local producers. Darby
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et al. (2008) found consumers are willing to pay almost double for products produced “locally”
relative to products from more distant locations, holding freshness constant.
Connolly and Klaiber (2014) analyzed consumer valuations of CSA contract attributes by
developing a hedonic model based on firm-level prices. Using data from 453 CSA farms in
Michigan, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, they estimated consumer valuations of CSA
contract attributes, including product offerings, CSA contract length, number of pick up days per
week, and production techniques such as various types of organic certification, pest management
and naturally grown certification. They found an 8% premium for CSA contracts offering freshcut flowers in addition to fresh vegetables, suggesting that CSA contracts covering a more
diverse bundle command higher prices. However, the effect of adding fruits or animal products
(dairy products, meat or eggs) to the contract was not statistically significant. They also found
that consumers had a positive and economically significant valuation of certified organic produce
provided by local CSA farms (7% premium). Consumers had positive valuations of other
attributes as well, which suggests that CSA farms can obtain a price premium by differentiating
themselves through marketing. However, the authors did not control for contract type in their
model; perhaps, because variation in contract type was not present in their sample. Our model
presented in the next section shows how contract type influences the CSA share price, and hence
how ignoring contractual arrangements can lead to biases associated with missing variables if the
contractual terms are not controlled for when engaging in empirical analysis.
CSA programs also provide benefits to farmers such as financial security and the
provision of working capital during the growing season. CSA contracting enables producers to
receive better prices for their crops, gain financial security as revenues are received before
harvest, and reduce the burden of marketing their commodities (U.S. Department of Agriculture
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2014b). Sabih and Baker (2000) found, using a case study approach, that a Canadian farm
offering CSA contracts was better off financially (had a higher return) than it would have been
had it sold its vegetables to the wholesale market and financed its operations through
conventional means such as line-of-credit or loan financing. Welsh (1997) suggested that the rise
of CSA contracting as well as farmer markets was partially driven by changes in the structure of
agriculture in which producers farm-level production decisions are increasingly being driven by
off-farm firms such as processors; so, CSA contracting allows the farm to maintain control over
production decisions.
While few studies attempt to model CSA contract prices, prior literature states that the
price of a CSA contract is typically set such that the operating costs, including a fair return to the
farmer's labor, can be covered (Brown and Miller 2008; Fieldhouse 1996). However, several
studies found that producers are not satisfied with their CSA program’s ability to cover their
costs. Only 46% of respondents to the 2001 national CSA survey indicated they were satisfied
with their ability to cover operating costs (Lass et al. 2003). Using survey data from farmers in
nine Midwestern states, Tegtmeier and Duffy (2005) found farms offering CSA programs
considered operational costs but not their labor costs when setting their CSA contract prices. In a
working paper, Lizio and Lass (2005), use four years of survey data from CSA farms in the
Northeast United States to show that CSA farms cover their costs only if farm operator’s labor is
not included. They also found CSA farms to be primarily price takers, consistent with Connolly
and Klaiber’s (2014) and Lizio and Lass (2005) findings that CSA farms exhibit little market
power. This suggests that CSA share prices are not determined solely by production costs.
This current paper fills the gap in the existing literature by developing a pricing model of
the various types of CSA share contracts. Our pricing model is derived from futures and options
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pricing, and it predicts that contracts in which consumers do not share in production risk, such as
“weight contracts”, will be priced higher than contracts in which the consumer shares in both
price and yield risk (“yield contracts”), all else equal. The higher price for weight contracts
includes a risk premium. We also model the decisions of farmers about which contract types to
offer while hedging risks. To our knowledge, the pricing of these different types of CSA
contracts and farmers’ contract supply decisions have not been formally modeled.
A General Equilibrium Model of CSA Contracting
Farmers may offer CSA contracts for sale depending on prevailing market contract prices,
knowledge about planting decisions and production technology, and expectations of future crop
prices at harvest. Consumers (including all non-farm producers) can choose to enter into CSA
contracts depending on prevailing contract prices and expectations about future spot prices of the
products under contract, according to their consumption and risk preferences. We assume all
contracts are delivered at harvest time; specifically, we assume that farmers engaging in weight
contracts cannot renege on the contracts and thus deliver all promised commodities even if this
requires the farmers to purchase shortfalls in the spot market. After consumers receive the
proceeds of their CSA contracts, spot markets clear for crops, with prices determined according
to crop yields, availability of other goods and the preferences of all market participants.
Hereafter we refer to all products under CSA contracts as “crops” or “produce”, but our use of
these terms does not preclude the farmer from producing dairy products, eggs or livestock
products, etc.
All expectations governing market clearing for CSA contracts are solved by backwards
induction. Specifically, the spot market prices for products at harvest time are determined in
general equilibrium. The equilibrium prices in the spot market are a deterministic function given
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the endowments and preferences of market participants, so price expectations are calculated from
equilibrium prices across all states of nature. Here, states of nature are all possible combinations
of yield outcomes across crops and their associated probabilities.
We assume that planting decisions are made prior to CSA contracting decisions. In
reality, planting and CSA contracting may occur simultaneously or overlap in time, but we
simplify them into discrete stages for analytical tractability. Having contracts bought and sold
after planting but before harvest preserves a realistic modeling component: farmers have
proceeds of contract sales as working capital in the event of credit constraints. In reality, farmers
make their planting decisions to maximize expected utility over the joint distribution of CSA
contract prices and yields, which crops are viable to grow, production costs and technology, and
land constraints. We ignore planting decisions in our model so that we can focus on the risksharing aspects of CSA contractual arrangements.
The CSA contracting market is a financial general equilibrium with contracting over
states of nature, as opposed to the post-harvest goods general equilibrium. There are no initial
endowments of contracts, so buyers and sellers are determined in equilibrium according to their
respective expected utilities and their other endowments (e.g., productive agricultural land, etc.).
These expected utilities are based on expectations about the spot market’s state post-harvest.
Essentially, utilities post-harvest are defined over tradable spot produce but not over tradable
contracts, whereas expected utilities during the contract market are defined over tradable
contracts and expectations about spot produce prices. Farmers’ expected utilities in the contract
market are also informed by knowledge of their production technology and costs, land capacity,
and any constraints they face.
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Thus, though price and utility expectations are solved via backwards induction, we
envision a simple process. At time t = 0 , farmers and consumers transact on CSA contracts and
equilibrium contract prices are determined as the contract market clears. At time t = T , the crop
is harvested, contract deliveries are realized and equilibrium crop spot prices are determined as
that market clears. We present the model stages in reverse order because all expectations in the
earlier period are functions of optimal decision-making in the latter period.
Post-Harvest General Equilibrium ( t = T )
After crops are harvested, prices are determined in general equilibrium. Consumer endowments
of produce are zero unless they purchased a CSA contract in the earlier period. If any consumer
bought a CSA contract, his endowments for each of the included crops is increased by the
contract deliveries, while the selling farmer’s endowments are reduced by the same amount.
Every farmer’s endowment of each crop is the realized crop yield less contract deliveries to her
customers. A farmer having a negative endowment for any one crop means she did not produce
enough to cover her contractual commitments.1 In this scenario, the farmer will have to make up
the shortfall by purchasing the crop in the spot market.
Farmers and consumers are assumed to have a strictly increasing and strictly concave,
von-Neumann and Morgenstern (vNM) utility function, u ( x ) , over the vector of all consumption
goods, x . While we do not assume a particular functional form for u ( x ) , we do assume utility is
bounded above and u ( 0 ) = −∞ .2 For simplicity, consumers and farmers only consider utility of
post-harvest consumption ( t = T ) , ignoring intermediate consumption during the first stage of
the model. Consumption utility in the final period includes all consumption goods, x , of which
food crops are a subset, so the post-harvest general equilibrium is in fact a model of the full
market for local food, other food, and all other goods.
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We assume there are I consumers, each with endowment vector wi and a consumption
vector xi . There are J farmers, each with endowment vector, w j , and consumption vector, x j .
Given prices, each consumer solves the Lagrangian:
(1)

max L = U ( xi ) + λi p ⋅ ( wi − xi )
xi

where p is the vector of prices, λi is the Lagrange multiplier for consumer i at time t = T , and

p ⋅ ( wi − xi ) is the budget constraint which sets the value of the endowment equal to the value of
consumption, given prices. The farmer problem is identical with subscripts j . There are M
consumption goods denoted xm , so a consumer’s (or farmer’s) consumption of good m is
denoted xim (or x jm ). Farmers’ yields for each crop are denoted y jm , and we use yields to mean
total production of the crop by that farmer, not production per acre or other unit of land. Farmer

j ’s total contract amounts sold for each crop are c jm ≤ 0 , so her endowments for crops she
produces are w jm = y jm + c jm . Conversely, consumers’ endowments of food crops are cim .
The necessary first order condition of the Lagrangian for each good m is:
(2)

∂U ( xi* )
∂xim

− λi* pm = 0

where U ' > 0 by our assumptions and λi* is the shadow price of the budget constraint, which is
given in this case by price times endowments. The first order conditions give an implicit solution
*
for the consumer’s demand, and strictly concave utility ensures a unique demand vector, xi ( p ) ,

as a function of any vector of positive prices, p ∈! m++ . Similarly, farmers’ demands are denoted

x *j ( p ) , but they may differ from consumers’ demands due to larger endowments of certain food
crops (and resulting budget constraints), and, possibly, different preferences.
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General equilibrium prices are then determined by the unique price vector, p* , that sets
aggregate excess demand of all consumers and farmers to zero for all M goods. p* solves

(

)

Σ i ( xi* − wi ) + Σ j x *j − w j = 0 . Strictly concave, increasing utility functions for all market

participants guarantee existence of a unique equilibrium price vector, p* , satisfying the above.

( )

*
*
Equilibrium demands are then, e.g., xi p , satisfying the budget constraint, p* ⋅ xi* − p* ⋅ wi = 0 .

The equilibrium prices serve to allocate goods across the economy in a manner that matches
endowments to demands. Thus, equilibrium prices, p* , necessarily depend on farm yields.
Contract Market Equilibrium ( t = 0 )
In the first time period, farmers and consumers are able to enter into contracts with respect to the
various CSA crops, but may choose not to do so. We model this set of choices in what follows.
First, we establish the general equilibrium in the contract market, and then we evaluate specific
contract types such as yield shares and weight shares. We assume that in the contract market
farmers and consumers can contract on any one crop (with infinitely divisible quantity). Farmers
may contract with many consumers or even with each other, and the same applies to consumers.
To make this precise, we define states of nature in terms of outcomes of the endowments
matrix, w (ω ) = ( w1 (ω ) ,…,wI +J (ω )) , which incorporates both the set of yield outcomes and
T

the possibly random endowments of non-crop goods. The aggregate endowments matrix,

s |Ω|×( I +J )×M , contains endowments matrices, sω = w (ω ) , specifying the endowments of all agents
in each state, ω , at time t = T . Probabilities of endowments matrices are defined by the
probability space, ( Ω,F ,P ) , where Ω is the set of all outcomes, F is the set of all subsets, and

P is a probability measure.
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Arrow (1964) showed that such a general equilibrium exists with uncertain future
endowments of many goods, so long as agents are risk averse and are price-takers. In particular,
if spot markets with anticipated prices exist for all consumption goods, then all consumption
decisions are spanned by trading on the numeraire using Arrow securities. The state prices of
these securities are positive and will sum to one if there is no arbitrage. Thus, the state prices can
be interpreted as a risk-adjusted probability distribution, Q . Also, trading does not have to be in
terms of Arrow securities if markets are complete; all prices of more complex instruments are
simply recovered from their fair prices (expected value) under Q .
We first start with some observations. Usually: (i) consumers will have zero endowments
for crop goods ( simω = 0 ) so they will be net buyers, (ii) farmers will have zero endowments for

(

)

crop goods they do not produce s jmω = 0 so they will be net buyers for these goods, and (iii)

(

)

farmers will have large positive endowments for crop goods they do produce s jnω > 0 , so they
will be net sellers for these goods.
Pricing of CSA Contract Types
We can now define the contract types of interest in a more intuitive manner than afforded by the
y
Arrow securities. In a yield contract, cmij
, farmer j commits a fixed percentage, α , of her
y
= α i ymj . In a weight contract, farmer j commits a fixed
random yield to consumer i , so cmij

w
quantity, cmij
, to consumer i . Consumer i ’s net contracts on crop m across all farmers are

(

)

y
w
cmi = Σ j cmij
+ cmij
, where it is possible that many (or all) farmers do not contract with consumer

(

)

y
w
i and usually cmi ≥ 0 . Similarly, farmer j ’s net contracts on crop m are cmj = −Σ i cmij + cmij ,

	
  

13

and usually cmj ≤ 0 . Contracts can only exist if they have both buyers and sellers, so for any crop

m , we must have that Σ i cmi + Σ j cmj = 0 .
Finally, contracts do not exist without some form of payment. In the contract market, the
buyer pays the seller from their endowment of the numeraire good ( m = 1) . Each contract’s unit
y
price is recovered from the risk-adjusted distribution, Q , and is denoted qmw for weight and qmj

for yield . We allow the yield unit price to be unique for each seller due to differing distributions
of their random yields, which could be due to production technology, land quality, etc. The
weight unit price does not vary because we assume away quality considerations; general
equilibrium with no arbitrage requires the weight unit price to be the same across sellers since
there is no risk in delivery. Accordingly, if consumer i buys contracts from farmer j , the net
w
y y
+ qmj
cmij , with either term being set to zero if that contract
payment of numeraire will be qmw cmij

type is not purchased.
To make comparisons between contract types, we evaluate them according to their
payoffs in each state. Intuitively, this is because consumers may adjust their demands even after
receiving contract deliveries or otherwise expect to participate in the spot market. In particular,
consumers may expect to buy some percentage of their consumption in the spot market, and may
even end up as sellers in the spot market if plans change or if they receive too much quantity
from a yield contract.
The value of the yield contract at harvest is equal to a percentage of the farm’s yield

( )

y
*
times the crop’s spot price at harvest, pm* , denoted v c jm = α j y jm ⋅ pm which is equivalent to a

percentage share, α j , of the farmer’s realized revenue for crop m . Under our assumptions for
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general equilibrium, the equilibrium contract price must equal its expectation under the risk-

( )

adjusted probability distribution, Q : q yjm = EQ ⎡⎣ v c yjm ⎤⎦ .
Weight contracts, on the other hand, deliver a fixed quantity, c wjm , at a pre-arranged price,

qmw , in the manner of a similar to forwards contract, so their value at harvest is

( )

v c wjm = c wjm ⋅ ( pm* − qmw ) . By no arbitrage, it must be that the weight contract is also priced
according to the risk-adjusted distribution, so: qmw = EQ ⎡⎣ pm* ⎤⎦ .
It is not guaranteed that the two contract types offer the same quantities in expectation.
For example, consider the basic model of farm production under risk by Lapan and Moschini
(1994), with optimal hedging in futures markets depending on the farmer’s risk aversion, the
yield-price covariance, and the basis risk. Even if farmers are identical except with respect to
contract type, the model is likely to imply different optimal hedges when futures or forward
markets (or weight shares) are used for hedging than when general shares are used to hedge. To
w
y
account for this, let Δc jm = c jm − EQ ⎡⎣ c jm ⎤⎦ denote the difference between the weight contract

quantity and the expected yield contract quantity (with expectation priced by the market).
In the case of weight contracts, the seller is responsible to make up any quantity shortfalls
on the open market, and therefore may bear more risk than under a yield contract arrangement.
While the forward contract structure of the weight contract removes price risk, it also removes
the natural hedge of prices against yields due to their negative correlation, which is induced by
spatial weather correlations and supply-and-demand factors. Proposition 1 formalizes the price
relationship between yield and weight contract prices for a given farmer.
Proposition 1. Given complete markets with no arbitrage, the price relationship between
yield and weight contracts is given by:
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(3)

qmw cmw − q yjm c yjm = Δc jm ⋅ EQ ⎡⎣ pm* ⎤⎦ − CovQ ⎡⎣ y jm , pm* ⎤⎦ .
Proofs of all propositions can be found in the supplementary appendix online. Proposition

1 makes explicit the risk pricing differences of the two contract types in the general equilibrium
market for contracts. For any farmer, j , the price premium of a weight contract has two
components, a yield premium, qmw Δc jm , and a risk premium, −CovQ [y jm , pm* ] . The yield premium
accounts for potential systematic differences in the expected yields between the two contract
types, while the risk premium compensates the farm for the removal of price as a natural hedge
*
on yield risk. Thus, if CovQ [y jm , pm ] < 0 (post-harvest spot prices are negatively correlated with

yields), then weight contracts will be more expensive unless they are expected to deliver a
substantially smaller quantity than yield contracts. If the (risk-adjusted) expected yield from the

(

)

yield contract is equal to the guaranteed quantity of the weight contract Δc jm = 0 , then the yield
premium is zero and the price premium of weight contracts (relative to yield contracts from the
same farmers) will equal the covariance of yield and harvest price.
Optimal Contracting Decisions for Risk Management
It is important to recognize that contract market equilibrium prices tell only part of the story –
farmers’ choices to offer weight or yield contracts and in what quantities depend on their risk
preferences, in addition to the risk management features of each contract and on prevailing
market prices. Consider, for example, a farmer growing a single crop, m , and assume that her
general equilibrium utility over future consumption is collapsed to a concave utility over her
future budget set. She maximizes expected utility over parameters, b w and b y , representing
allocations to weight contracts and to yield contracts respectively, where b y is in units of
percentage of the yield. Her objective is then:
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(

(

) )

max bw ,b y EU b y q yjm + b w qmw + (1− b y ) ym − b w pm* .

(4)

We can use the familiar mean-variance Taylor approximation of expected utility to
approximate expected utility as a function of the mean and variance of income.
1 U ′′ ( µ X )
1
E (U ( X )) ≈ U ( µ X ) + σ X2
= U ( µ X ) − σ X2 Ra ( µ X ) ,
2
U ′ ( µX )
2

(5)

where Ra is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, evaluated at the mean of X , and where:
(6)

µ = b y q yjm + b w qmw + (1− b y ) E ⎡⎣ ym pm* ⎤⎦ − b w E ⎡⎣ pm* ⎤⎦ ; and

(7)

σ 2 = (1− b y ) Var ⎡⎣ ym pm* ⎤⎦ + ( b w ) Var ⎡⎣ pm* ⎤⎦ − (1− b y ) b w Cov ⎡⎣ ym pm* , pm* ⎤⎦ .
2

2

{

}

The necessary first order condition for the farmer’s problem for each b ∈ b w ,b y is:

∂EU
∂ µ 1 ∂σ 2
≈U'
− Ra
=0,
∂b
∂b 2
∂b

(8)

where we assume away indirect effects on the absolute risk aversion coefficient (via small
changes in the mean) as second-order small. Thus, this is the classic mean-variance utility model
in which expected utility is increasing in mean income and decreasing in the variance of income.
Each contracting choice maximizes utility by sacrificing mean income to reduce variance. It can
also be verified without the Taylor approximation that this choice problem is concave and the
optimal choice is unique.
The marginal effect of each contracting choice on mean income is a loss of the market
equilibrium risk premium. The risk premium equals expected contract value minus market price,
which is reasonably assumed to be positive (and guaranteed so by our general equilibrium
model):
(9)

	
  

∂µ
= q yjm − E ⎡⎣ ym pm* ⎤⎦ < 0 ,
∂b y
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(10)

∂µ
= qmw − E ⎡⎣ pm* ⎤⎦ < 0 .
∂b w

The marginal effect of each contracting choice on the variance of income is a function of the
choice for the other contract type, the covariance of revenues and prices, and either the variance
of revenue or the variance of price. The marginal effects on variance of income are:
(11)

∂σ 2
= −2 (1− b y ) Var ⎡⎣ ym pm* ⎤⎦ + b wCov ⎡⎣ ym pm* , pm* ⎤⎦ , and
y
∂b

(12)

∂σ 2
= 2b wVar ⎡⎣ pm* ⎤⎦ − (1− b y ) Cov ⎡⎣ ym pm* , pm* ⎤⎦ .
w
∂b
A key feature of these relationships is that the value of weight contracts as a hedge

depends on the covariance of revenues (price times yield) and prices. The cross partial effect on
mean income is zero ( ∂ 2 µ / ∂b y ∂b w = 0 ) , but the cross partial effect on variance of income is
exactly equal to the revenue-price covariance:
(13)

∂σ 2
= Cov ⎡⎣ ym pm* , pm* ⎤⎦ .
y
w
∂b ∂b

(

)

Despite our assumption of negative yield-price covariance Cov ⎡⎣ ym , pm* ⎤⎦ < 0 , the sign of the
revenue-price covariance is not known with certainty. The sign of Cov ⎡⎣ ym pm* , pm* ⎤⎦ may be
positive or negative depending on the nature of the statistical dependence structure between
prices and yields, even when Cov ⎡⎣ ym , pm* ⎤⎦ is assumed to be negative.
Proposition 2. Assuming risk-averse farmers and system parameters such that contract
sales are non-negative ( b w* ≥ 0, b y* ≥ 0 ) , then:
Claim 2.1. Positive price-revenue covariance implies farmers may specialize or diversify
contract offerings. Formally, Cov ⎡⎣ ym pm* , pm* ⎤⎦ > 0 ⇒ b y* ∈[ 0,1) , b w* ≥ 0 .
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Claim 2.2. Negative price-revenue covariance and positive sales of weight contracts can only
co-exist if farmers simultaneously oversell yield contracts (above 100%). Formally,

b w* > 0 ∩ Cov ⎡⎣ ym pm* , pm* ⎤⎦ < 0 ⇒ b y* > 1 .
Claim 2.3. Except as in Claim 2.2, non-positive price-revenue covariance implies zero sales
of weight contracts and partial or zero sales of yield contracts. Formally,

Cov ⎡⎣ ym pm* , pm* ⎤⎦ ≤ 0 ∩ b y* < 1 ⇒ b w* = 0 .
Claim 2.4. Positive price-revenue covariance implies optimal choices for b y* and b w* will
diverge in response to changes in the price-revenue covariance. Formally,

∂b w* / ∂Cov ⎡⎣ ym pm* , pm* ⎤⎦ > 0 and ∂b y* / ∂Cov ⎡⎣ ym pm* , pm* ⎤⎦ ≤ 0 . Marginal effects of price changes
are ambiguous without further assumptions.
Proposition 2 shows how farmers will make tradeoffs between yield contracts and weight
contracts according to parameters they face, focusing on the sign of the price-revenue
covariance. Other than the edge case of extreme negative covariance supporting weight contracts
alongside oversold yield contracts (Claim 2.2), non-positive covariance of prices and revenues
translates to zero sales of weight contracts and farmers offering yield contracts only, if at all. On
the other hand, positive covariance of prices and revenues is the only regime supporting
diversification across contract types, so farmers may offer either or both contracts in positive
quantities while not overselling the yield contracts. Here, if positive quantities of both contract
types are sold, the contract mix will be sensitive to the covariance; yield contracts will optimally
decrease as positive covariance increases further, while weight contracts will optimally increase,
all else equal (including prices). Intuitively, the yield contract offers a perfect hedge against risk
while the weight contract offers an imperfect hedge. Increasing the price-revenue covariance
(prices constant) improves the hedging value of weight contracts relative to yield contracts.
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Effects of Crop Diversification on Optimal Contracting
The first order conditions also tell us about the benefits of diversification as a risk management
tool for farmers. When farmers are specialized in the production of a specific product, crop
diversification may come at a low cost while substantially reducing variance. The risk
management benefits of diversification will be strongest when the covariance of prices and
revenues across crops is low.
To show the effects of diversification, we present an example derived from the monocrop farmer of the previous section. Suppose this farmer is able to split her farm equally between
two crops with independent and identically distributed (IID) yields, prices and revenues, as well
as identical market prices for both contract types. The symmetry of our example problem means
contract choices will be identical for each crop ( b1y = b2y := b y / 2, b1w = b2w := b w / 2 ) , so we can
make meaningful comparisons of total contracting of the diversified farmer versus the monocrop farmer. Since both halves of the farm are now IID for the diversified farmer, all variance
and covariance terms within crops and prices are halved ( e.g., 2Var [ 0.5X ] = 0.5Var [ X ]) . The
net effect of this change is to cut in half the marginal effect of contract choices on the variance of
income. In particular, Equations 11 and 12 are multiplied by one-half to become:
(14)

(15)

∂σ 2
1
= − (1− b y ) Var ⎡⎣ yp* ⎤⎦ + b wCov ⎡⎣ yp* , p* ⎤⎦ , and
y
∂b
2
∂σ 2
1
= b wVar ⎡⎣ p* ⎤⎦ − (1− b y ) Cov ⎡⎣ yp* , p* ⎤⎦ ,
w
∂b
2

where we remove crop subscripts ( m ) due to identical crop distributions for both crop 1 and
crop 2. Since marginal mean income effects are unchanged, the diversified farmer will modify
contracting choices to double the marginal effects on variance (relative to the mono-crop
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farmer’s choices), if possible. If the new parameters are such that an interior solution cannot be
maintained, then corner solutions of zero sales will occur for one or both contract types.
Proposition 3. Assuming diversification means division of the farm into IID crops as
described above, we compare the choices of diversified farmers against those of mono-crop
farmers, all else held equal:
Claim 3.1. Diversification will cause some farmers to move from an interior solution
(positive sales) in both contracts to a corner solution (zero sales) in at least one.
Claim 3.2. Effects of diversification on farmers who maintain an interior solution cannot
be signed without further assumptions; this includes the extreme case of speculation under large
negative covariance.
Claim 3.3. Diversification will cause farmers with b w* = 0 to double the amount held
back from yield contracts, (1− b y* ) , or else move from b y* ≤ 0.5 to b y* = 0 . That is, these
farmers will have b y* unambiguously decrease.
Claim 3.4. Diversification will cause farmers with b y* = 0 to decrease the amount of
weight contracts, b w* , to a new interior solution, or else move to b w* = 0 from

b w* ≤ 0.25 ⋅Cov ⎡⎣ yp* ⎤⎦ / Var ⎡⎣ p* ⎤⎦ .
Proposition 3 shows that diversification will reduce the scale of contracts sold in some
cases, but not all. Farmers whose preferences and production parameters are such that they
already specialize in one contract type will remain specialized as they diversify. These farmers
will also unambiguously reduce or eliminate the amount of contracts they sell if they become
more diversified. Overall, it is likely that many farmers will continue to use CSA contracts for
risk management, even when they become more diversified in crop production, but they may
decrease the number of contracts sold.
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Revisiting the Modeling Assumptions
The existence of a general equilibrium hinges on several assumptions that might not be grounded
in reality. First, the model assumes perfect information, namely, that expected yields and
associated yield distributions are known by farmers and consumers. In reality, it is unlikely that
consumers know the farmers’ yield distribution. Second, the general equilibrium model assumes
that all agents are price-takers and cannot exert market power; however, very little research has
investigated the structure of CSA markets. Further, the establishment of a competitive market
environment is required before certain empirical exercises can be undertaken; we discuss this in
more detail in the next section. Third, our model assumes that farmers cannot shirk, but actual
CSA contract terms are generally informal with very few CSA contracts stipulating the course of
action should there be a full loss of farm production due to weather or disease. Assuming that the
CSA contract market is a repeat game removes farmers’ incentives to voluntarily shirk by using
suboptimal input levels, selling high priced commodities in the spot market instead of fulfilling
their contractual obligations, or completely abandoning the crop. More generally, when contracts
are incomplete, asymmetric information leads to moral hazard. Thus, future research is needed to
determine if our modeling assumptions hold.
Finally, our model assumes that contracts are infinitely divisible and that consumers and
farmers contract on individual products. In actuality, the farmers offer a contract that covers
multiple goods and consumers must accept the entire bundle. So long as the bundle involves
additively separable yields of each crop, the diversification hypothesis above holds. However, if
farmers deliver excess yields of over-performing crops to compensate low yields of underperforming crops in the same basket, then the yield contracts are no longer additively separable.
In this scenario, the farmer is using diversification to provide insurance on the yield contracts,
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and this limiting her own risk management benefit from contracting. If non-separable yield
contracts are the norm, then we would expect to see diversification be negatively correlated with
the variety and scope of contract offerings.
Empirical Research Challenges
Future research is also needed to test the implications of the theoretical model. Although testing
these implications is beyond the scope of this paper, we collected data from Farm Fresh Rhode
Island to determine the prevalence of the various types of CSA contractual arrangements and
further motivate the need for future research. Farm Fresh Rhode Island is a non-profit
organization that promotes local food systems by maintaining an extensive online database of
both CSA farms and non-CSA farms located in Rhode Island and neighboring states. Information
pertaining to the types of CSA contracts offered by the farm was collected directly from Farm
Fresh Rhode Island’s website (www.farmfreshri.org), the individual farm websites, or by calling
the farm. Complete information was obtained for 226 CSA farms within a 150-mile radius of
Providence, RI. We focus on farms in New England because it is where the first CSA programs
in the United States were started (Wilkinson 2001) and thus CSA programs have a long
established history in this area.
As shown in table 1, the majority of the farms (approximately 79%) offer yield contracts
while approximately 9% offer weight contracts. A wide variety of products are provided by
various CSA contracts and nearly all CSA contracts deliver vegetables. Other offered products
include fruits, herbs, cut flowers and, to a lesser extent, eggs, dry goods and meat products. Most
CSA farms in the sample offer more than one product category to its members, so it is difficult to
categorize a particular CSA program as a “vegetable” or “fruit” CSA program. Table 1 also
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suggests that there is a great deal of variability across CSA contracts. Table 2 shows the
correlations between the various categories of product offerings.
While more research is needed to better understand the CSA contracting market, it is
likely that researchers will face several challenges when engaging in empirical analysis. Perhaps
the most important question that researchers must address is whether or not the assumption of
perfect competition holds; as this is required for not only our theoretical model but also for
certain empirical exercises. For example, many of the proposed testable propositions can be
explored through the estimation of a hedonic pricing model. Hedonic pricing models attempt to
decompose the prices paid by consumers into willingness to pay for various aspects or attributes
of the good. Hence, firm-level data (data on prices charged by farms) can only be used to
estimate hedonic models if price-cost markups are first eliminated (Feenstra 1995). In other
words, the competitiveness of the market must be established. Internal tests of competitiveness
on individual datasets are necessary due to the lack of studies exploring the structure of CSA
contract markets. One noteworthy exception is the study presented in a working paper by Lass,
Lavoie, and Fetter (2005), who found that CSA farms exert very little market power (only 2% of
their potential market power). However, given the limited literature on market power, and since
cost data are not readily available, the steps taken by Connolly and Klaiber (2014) (who follow
Breshnahan and Reiss (1991)) could be replicated by researchers to determine if the CSA market
in question has free entry (a characteristic of competitive markets) prior to conducting empirical
work. Once competitive markets are established, then neither consumers nor producers will have
sufficient market power to impact prices and hedonic pricing models can be used to carefully test
theoretical propositions. Other factors that potentially affect the competitiveness of CSA markets
include the location of the farm in proximity to urban areas as well as the ability to sell final
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products produced on the farm through other channels; hence, these data should also be collected
when conducting empirical work on CSA contracting.
CSA contracts are generally sold by the “share”; many CSA farms offer consumers the
option of purchasing a “full” share or a “half” share. A “full” share is designed to provide
enough products for 4-5 people and a “half” share is designed to provide enough products for 2-3
people. Given that a “share” is not an objective measure of expected quantity, obviously, there is
likely a great deal of variability in the expected delivery quantities across CSA contracts. As
shown in the theory section, yield contracts that have the same expected delivery quantities will
have different equilibrium prices if the underlying yield distributions are different. Combining
differences in (i) expected delivery quantities, (ii) products covered, (iii) price and yield
covariances, and (iv) yield distributions, translates into variability in share prices across farmers
which can be difficult to decompose, especially over a menu of contract prices.
In addition, obtaining information on expected delivery quantities is difficult in empirical
work; while actually quantities delivered might be verified by diligent researchers, expected
delivery quantities are generally just estimates provided by the farmer to potential consumers.
Farmers may transmit this information to potential consumers via marketing materials (e.g., a
website or CSA program brochure), but many farmers in our Farm Fresh dataset did not disclose
any information regarding expected delivery quantities. Further, it is unclear how farmers that do
report expected delivery quantities arrived at these values; perhaps they are the average
quantities delivered in prior years or true forward-looking expectations based on plantings. None
of the farms in our sample disclosed information on yield variability. An added empirical
challenge from unobservable yields is the inability to measure price-yield covariance, revenue, or
price-revenue covariance for a given crop.
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CSA contracts terms or length of the “season” also tend to vary substantially from
contract to contract. Thus, the number of deliveries and the length of time between deliveries are
also likely to influence the prices consumers are willing to pay. In order to be able to compare
the share prices of contracts across CSA with different lengths, researchers must attempt to
construct a measure that standardizes the expected amount of products across the contract period.
For example, the price per delivery could be constructed by dividing the share price by CSA
length. However, constructing such a measure that attempts to standardize contract prices across
farmers hinges on the underlying assumption that various contracts with different lengths deliver
comparable products each week which is not likely to be the case.
Furthermore, the production practices of the farm might affect the prices consumers are
willing to pay for the products covered by the CSA contract, and hence these production
processes should also be accounted for in any empirical model. For example, consumers might
be willing to pay premiums for products produced using organic practices, chemical-free farming
practices, or integrated pest management techniques. Moreover, such practices might also
influence the distribution of expected yields and hence affect final endowments and state prices.
Separating an observed premium for a particular production process into the consumer
preferences for the process and impacts on the yield distribution will be particularly challenging.
Other factors potentially affecting the CSA contract prices include the convenience
associated with obtaining the deliveries and non-monetary costs of membership. The majority of
CSA farms (at least in our sample) require members to pick up their share of the products at the
farm. Other CSA farms require consumer to pick up the products at a farmers market or another
location such as a church or place of business. Only two CSA farms in our Farm Fresh sample
delivered the products directly to their members. Further, the concept of a CSA program is
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grounded in linking consumers to their food source and farmers. As a result, CSA programs
sometimes require members to “volunteer” on the farm, to help with planting, with weeding
during the growing season or with the harvest. Mandatory work requirements for members, in
some cases, may also impact the price of CSA contracts, all else equal.
Conclusions
In recent years, community supported agriculture programs have emerged as an important direct
marketing strategy used by farmers in many states. CSA contracts let consumers buy directly a
proportion of a farm’s production and thus are a key part of local food and farm-to-table
movements, as well as a source of risk management for produce farmers. A variety of contract
types have arisen to meet the needs of farmers and consumers, and we evaluate those contracts in
the context of a two-period equilibrium model, using asset-pricing theory. In our theory, risk
transfer has a significant effect on the contract price: share prices for pre-specified weights are
more expensive than shares that deliver a proportion of the farm’s production because the
consumer does not bear any of the farmer’s yield risk under the latter contractual arrangements.
Our CSA share pricing model indicates that the price differential between yield contracts
and weight contracts is determined by two potentially competing factors, namely, the yield
premium, which is due to the two types of contracts delivering different expected quantities, and
the risk premium, which is due to the farm giving up price risk as a natural hedge for yield risk
under weight share contracts. The risk premium is expected to be heterogeneous, both across
farms, and across crops within farms. Further research is necessary to tease out these factors.
Adding to the complications of undertaking empirical work is the fact that many of the
CSA contracts cover multiple commodities over various contract lengths. In our theory, we
assumed the farmers contract on individual products; an abstraction from reality in which
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consumers and producers are actually contracting on a basket of goods. Even with only one crop
the covariance between prices and revenues, and therefore between contract payoffs, affects the
producer’s optimal decision regarding the number and types of contracts to offer. Additional
complexity arises in disentangling price relationships when contracts are over multiple crops.
Farms frequently grow multiple commodities as a risk management strategy; any crops not
perfectly correlated allow farms to benefit from diversification by reducing the variance of the
farm’s revenues. Farmers may also trade off the risk management benefits of diversification with
the risk management benefits of offering CSA contracts, especially if they are using
diversification to insure the consumer against individual crop shortfalls in bundled yield
contracts.
Clearly, further research is needed to understand how farmers utilize CSA contracting as
a risk management strategy. This paper raises several empirical issues to be addressed in future
research including market structure considerations, problems associated with obtaining
information on actual and expected yields, the completeness of the contracts and agency
problems. While our paper presents a theory of CSA contracting pricing, our model is a
simplified view of the world. For example, we do not address how CSA contracting can ease
credit constraints, how contracting impacts production decision or why consumers engage in
CSA contracts. We ignored these elements to focus on the risk management features of CSA
programs. Thus, more theoretical work is needed as well.
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1
For convenience and to differentiate them, we use ‘his’ and ‘her’ pronouns for consumers and
farmers, respectively, without regard to actual gender.
2

The utility conditions ensure that expected utility-maximizing farmers limit the number of

contracts they sell, to avoid a positive probability of being unable to meet their obligations. This,
in turn, ensures the existence of the post-harvest general equilibrium for spot produce.	
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Table 1. CSA Farm and Contract Characteristics
Variable
Share Type
General Share
Weight Share
Debit Share
You-Pick Share

Frequency

Percent

179
21
13
13

79.2
9.29
5.75
5.75

Pick-up Location
Farm
Farmers Market
Other

180
16
30

79.65
7.08
13.27

CSA Products
Fruits
Vegetables
Herbs
Flowers
Dry Goods
Dairy/Meat
Eggs

157
211
170
132
88
69
85

69.47
93.36
75.22
58.41
38.94
30.53
37.61

Observations

226

Note: Data were farm-level data for farms offering CSA located within a 150-mile radius
of Providence, Rhode Island and listed on Farm Fresh Rhode Island’s website
(www.farmfreshri.org).
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Table 2. Correlations between CSA Product Offerings

Fruits
Vegetables
Herbs
Flowers
Dry Goods
Dairy/Meat
Eggs

Fruits
1.0000
0.3636
0.2871
0.2008
0.1747
-0.0612
0.0982

Vegetables

Herbs

Flowers

1.0000
0.4646
0.2438
-0.0058
-0.3250
-0.1966

1.0000
0.2227
0.0379
-0.2204
-0.1256

1.0000
0.1215
-0.0838
0.0436

Dry Goods Dairy/Meat

1.0000
0.1997
0.2230

1.0000
0.4968

Note: Data were farm-level data for farms offering CSA located within a 150-mile radius
of Providence, Rhode Island and listed on Farm Fresh Rhode Island’s website
(www.farmfreshri.org)
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Eggs

1.0000

